Shutting the 'Davao Death Squad' down: A wild goose chase?

All eyes are now on Davao City, as the public inquiry, which is spearheaded by the Commission on Human Rights, over the extrajudicial killings opened last Monday. “The killings have gone on for too long and it’s time to hold those responsible to account,” the INQUIRER report says. “With this message, Commission on Human Rights (CHR) Chair Leila de Lima is set to open on Monday a public inquiry into a wave of unexplained killings of more than 800 people in Davao City since 1998.” (See INQUIRER’s CHR probes 800 kills by Davao death squad)

This isn't the first that a move to hold those behind the extrajudicial killing accountable has been made. As The Mindanao Daily Mirror noted, "Throughout the past decade there have been a number of times in which so-called civil society has risen up to denounce the long series of summary killings that have victimized hundreds of people in Davao City."

This renewed invigoration over the unsolved killings in Davao City spurred me to re-read that part of Alston Report, “Davao: Vigilantism or Death Squad,” which talked about the death squad justice in the city.

Two years ago, Professor Phillip Alston, Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Human Rights Council on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, visited the country to investigate the rampant extra-judicial killings in the Philippines. After spending ten days in the country in February 2007, he made a report, titled “Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development,” which came to be known as simply the Alston Report.

In the Alston Report, a portion can be found as regards the notorious “death squad” in Davao City, locally known as “DDS” (Davao Death Squad). Following is an excerpt of the Alston Report regarding Davao City’s “death squad justice,” as Alston phrased it.

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IX. DAVAO: VIGILANTISM OR DEATH SQUAD?

It is a commonplace that a death squad known as the “Davao Death Squad” (DDS) operates in Davao City. However, it has become a polite euphemism to refer vaguely to “vigilante groups” when accounting for the shocking predictability with which criminals, gang members, and street children are extrajudicially executed. One fact points very strongly to the officially-sanctioned character of these killings: No one involved covers his face. The men who warn mothers that their children will be the next to die unless they make themselves scarce turn up on doorsteps undisguised. The men who gun down or, and this is becoming more common, knife children in the streets almost never cover their faces. In fact, for these killers to wear “bonnets” is so nearly unheard of that the witnesses I interviewed did not think to mention the fact until I asked. None of those with whom I spoke had witnessed such persons covering their faces, and one knowledgeable advocate informed me that they do so in no more than two cases out of one hundred.

The mayor is an authoritarian populist who has held office, aside from a brief stint as a congressman, since 1988. His program is simple: to reach a local peace with the CPP/NPA/NDF and to “strike hard” at criminals. When we spoke, he insisted that he controls the army and the police, saying, “The buck stops here.” But, he added, more than once, “I accept no criminal liability.” While repeatedly acknowledging that it was his “full responsibility” that hundreds of murders committed on his watch remained unsolved, he would perfunctorily deny the existence of a death squad and return to the theme that there are no drug laboratories in Davao. The mayor freely acknowledged that he had publicly stated that he would make Davao “dangerous” and “not a very safe place” for criminals, but he insisted that these statements were for public consumption and would have no effect on police conduct: “Police know the law. Police get their training.” The mayor’s positioning is frankly untenable: He dominates the city so thoroughly as to stamp out whole genres of crime, yet he remains powerless in the face of hundreds of murders committed by men without masks in view of witnesses.

It is a reality that when the major was first elected, the NPA routinely killed policemen. It is also a reality that Davao has a problem with youth gangs. These are primarily ad hoc social groups for street children aged 10-25, but use of drugs and involvement in petty crime is common, and violent gang wars do take place. By all accounts, the mayor has managed to largely insulate his city from the armed conflict and to limit the presence of some kinds of criminal activity. These accomplishments appear to have bought acquiescence in the measures he takes, and the public remains relatively ignorant of the human cost of death squad “justice”.

The human cost is very high. Since 1998, when civil society organizations began keeping careful records, over 500 people have been killed by the death squad. Up until 2006, these victims were generally shot; since then, stabbings have become more common. I spoke with witnesses and family members of 8 victims and 1 survivor, and I reviewed the case files of an additional 6 victims and 3 survivors. These interviews gave some insights into how these killings take place and the enormous emotional damage they inflict on family and friends. The executions generally respond to suspicions of petty crimes, are preceded by warnings or notifications that clarify their significance, and are carried out publicly and with methodical indifference.

How does the death squad operate? The inquiries I made do not provide a complete picture, but they do indicate two starting points for investigation and reform. First, it would appear that the “assets” who identify targeted individuals for the death squad are often suspected criminals who are recruited after being arrested, with an early release as inducement. Second, it would appear that barangay officials are sometimes involved in selecting targets for the death squad, a practice perhaps originating in the role barangay officials have played in naming suspected drug dealers for inclusion in PNP watch lists. Insofar as prison officials and barangay councils help the death squad function, they can be reformed. The intelligence gathering role played by barangay officials can be limited, and the processing of inmates can be more tightly restricted. To shut the death squad down will, however, ultimately require following the evidence upward to the handlers who task “assets” to provide the location of persons on watch lists and who direct hit men to kill them. If it were not for the fact that the local office of the CHRP denies the existence of a death squad, it should be capable of `conducting an effective investigation. There are many witnesses who would provide information anonymously or who would testify were they to receive a credible protection arrangement.

Defending the rights of street children may be unpopular, but no one deserves to be stabbed to death for petty crimes. There are already preliminary indications that these practices are being replicated in other parts of Mindanao and in Cebu, and this trend needs to be halted immediately.

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Nothing has changed since to reverse Professor Alston’s observation, except that the numbers of being killed extra-judicially keep on increasing while local authorities remain largely unperturbed.